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SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT LICENSES

Introduction
The merger and acquisition of companies using software
technology can generate a need to transfer valuable software
licenses from a target company to an acquiring company.
High-technology companies retain software licenses for
multiple purposes, including the internal use of modified
software tools and the incorporation of such tools into
software products. When a company is acquired, state law
may recognize a transfer of rights where software licenses are
transferred to an acquiring company from the target.
However, as a default rule in the Ninth Circuit, a licensee
cannot assign a non-exclusive copyright license without the
express authorization of the licensor. Consequently, an
acquired licensee may be forced to renegotiate an otherwise
valid software license, even if it survives the acquisition and
continues to operate as a subsidiary.
The issue of copyright license transferability was one of
first impression for the Ninth Circuit in 1984.1 To reach a
decision, the court relied in part on case law addressing
patent license transferability, stating: "Where precedent in
copyright cases is lacking, it is appropriate to look for
guidance to patent law 'because of the historic kinship
between patent law and copyright law.'- 2 Upon review of
federal copyright policies and applicable patent law, the Ninth
Circuit determined that a non-exclusive copyright license
cannot be transferred without the consent of the licensor.3
Still, parties can contractually waive the need for express
authorization. This waiver can be efficient and effective in
software licenses.4 However, some agreements are negotiated
by unsophisticated parties and do not include a provision
that deals with assignment. Small companies with such non-

1. See Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984).
2. See id. (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
436, 439 (1984)).
3. See id. at 1333-35.
4. "[Mlany software licenses contain express provisions permitting the
license to be assigned or transferred under certain conditions. In such cases,
the permissibility of a transfer of license rights will turn on whether the
conditions for transfer were met or excused, not whether the transfer is
permitted." Steven A. Marenberg and Elliot Brown, 'Scope of Use' Restrictions in
Software Licenses, 10 No. 12 Computer Law. 13 (1993).
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exclusive licenses are frequently purchased and integrated
into larger corporations. The Ninth Circuit's default rule
would prevent an assignment in these situations if state law
recognized a transfer of rights following the merger.
In addition, companies that reorganize in bankruptcy
often require the assumption and assignment of licenses to
resume normal business operations or to facilitate an
equitable return on assets. In these predicaments, the default
rule: 1) prevents a debtor in possession from assuming the
software license and rights enjoyed before bankruptcy; and 2)
prevents a bankruptcy trustee from assigning a non-exclusive
license to a third party in conjunction with the sale of assets,
which bankruptcy law would otherwise allow (despite a
license provision to the contrary). Understandably, the issue
of copyright license transferability continues to pose a
problem in mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies.
This note will analyze the Ninth Circuit's decision to
prohibit the assignment of copyright licenses and, more
particularly, its impact on software licenses. The proposed
policies for restricting the transfer and assignment of
copyright licenses will be discussed. Moreover, this note will
illustrate why a separate rule should be recognized for the
assignment of software licenses in mergers and bankruptcies.
The growing realm of software licensing has produced a
unique environment where licenses are the lifeblood of
corporations. The ruleenunciated by the Ninth Circuit should
be changed to promote the efficient utilization of software and
resources. While this note does not advocate the
establishment of a secondary market for software licenses, an
exception to the default rule should be made.
I
Background
A.

Assignment Is Controlled by Federal Common Law

The assignment of contractual rights under a patent or
copyright license by a licensee is not addressed in the Patent
Act5 or Copyright Act., Consequently, a licensee must rely on
5. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 1983
& Supp. 1999).
6. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (West 1996 & Supp.
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common law to determine if a license can be transferred
without the consent of the licensor when the agreement does
not address the issue. Generally, state contract law governs
the interpretation of licenses 7 under principles derived from
the Erie doctrine. 8
There has been some confusion and controversy
regarding the applicability of state law to the assignment of
patent licenses following Erie.9 However, it appears settled
that the assignment of rights under a patent or copyright
license is governed by federal common law. 0 Unfortunately
for licensees, federal common law prevents the application of
state principles that favor transferability.l"
B. When Do Assignment Issues Arise?

1. Mergers and Bankruptcies
Case law demonstrates that assignment issues frequently
arise in two instances: 1) merger and acquisition activity; and
2) the assumption and assignment of executory contracts
during bankruptcy.1 2 In the first instance, an acquired or
merged licensee seeks to utilize the contractual rights that it
enjoyed before the change of ownership. In the second
instance, a trustee or debtor in possession seeks to assume
the license of a failed company and, in some cases, assign
that license to a third party.1 3 Prior to the Ninth Circuit's
decisions in Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrak Corporation4 and
Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 5 it was understood
that a license could be assumed by the trustee and assigned
1999).
7. See Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673,
677 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
8. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. See, e.g., Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 737-39

(Cal. 1957).
10. See Everex, 89 F.3d at 677-80; see also SQL Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle
Corp., 1991 WL 626458, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
11. See Everex, 89 F.3d at 677-80.
12. See Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc. (In re Catapult
Entertainment, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Institut Pasteur v.
Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997), SQL Solutions, 1991 WL
626458 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
13. See Harris, 734 F.2d at 1332; see also Everex, 89 F.3d at 673.
14. Everex, 89 F.3d at 673.
15. Perlman, 165 F.3d at 747.
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in a bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding federal common law to
the contrary.
However, the Ninth Circuit has held that section 365(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code 7 disallows such an exception to federal
common law.' Other circuits will presumably follow this
16. Generally, "Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee in
bankruptcy (or, in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor in possession) the authority to
assume, assign, or reject the executory contracts and unexpired leases of the
debtor, notwithstanding any contrary provisions appearing in such contracts or
leases." Id. at 749 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) & (I)). Backed by this provision,
bankruptcy trustees and reorganized debtors have endeavored to assume the
rights granted under non-exclusive copyright licenses, and in some instances to
assign those rights to a third party, despite non-assignment provisions in the
actual agreement. See id. at 749-50; see also Institut Pasteur, 104 F.3d at 49091; Everex, 89 F.3d at 674-75.
17. A trustee's or reorganized debtor's ability to assume and assign
contracts is not absolute. See Perlman, 165 F.3d at 749. Section 365(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that:
[A] trustee [or reorganized debtor (debtor in possession)] may not
assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if (1) (A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in
possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment or rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment....
11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (emphasis added).
18. In Everex, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
federal rule prohibiting the assignment of non-exclusive patent licenses
constitutes "applicable law" under Section 365, stating that: "Federal law...
would excuse Cadtrak [the licensor] from accepting performance from, or
rendering it to, anyone other than CFLC [the licensee]." Everex, 89 F.3d at 679.
Consequently, the debtor in Everex was unable to assume and assign a nonexclusive patent license to a company purchasing its remaining assets in
bankruptcy. Id.
More importantly, in Perlman, the Ninth Circuit held that a debtor corporation
reorganizing in bankruptcy (a merger following bankruptcy where the debtor
would operate as a subsidiary), could not assume the rights under a nonexclusive patent license enjoyed prior to the implementation of its
reorganization plan. Perlman, 1999 WL 33702 at *2. Unlike Everex, there was
no actual assignment of rights to a third party in Perlman because the court
viewed the reorganized debtor as the original licensee requesting assumption of
its own contract. Id. at *2-3. The licensee did not dissolve following the merger
and bankruptcy. See id. at *2. Still, the court held that Section 365(c)
by its terms bars a debtor in possession from assuming an executory
contract without the nondebtor's consent where applicable law
precludes assignment of the contract to a third party. The literal
language of § 365(c)(1) is thus said to establish "hypothetical test": a
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decision in accordance with the persuasive value traditionally
assigned to Ninth Circuit opinions. Thus, when a license does
not address assignment, the default rule prohibiting the
transfer of rights by a licensee is the same in mergers,
acquisitions and bankruptcy proceedings.
2. End-User License vs. "CopyrightUse" License

There is a distinction between widespread end-user"9
licenses and software agreements that resemble the typical
mechanical copyright license.2 ° The former agreement allows
the licensee to transfer limited use rights in a single copy of
software, while the latter gives rise to assignment issues."
Ordinarily, an end-user license transfers title in a single
copy of software and the licensor retains all copyright
ownership in the work. 22 The end-user (licensee) receives the
"general right to possess and use the software." 23 As the

debtor in possession may not assume an executory contract over the
nondebtor's objection if applicable law would bar assignment to a
hypothetical third party, even where the debtor in possession has no
intention of assigningthe contract in question to any such third party.
See id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a similar debtor
in possession was not a different entity from that in the original patent license
and federal law did not preclude the assumption of the patent license under
Section 365(c). See Institute, 104 F.3d at 493-94. The First Circuit applied a
different interpretation of Section 365 in which the debtor could assume the
non-exclusive patent license because an assignment to a third party would not
transpire, actually or hypothetically. See id. at 493. Hence, a split in the
Circuits is evinced by the First and Ninth Circuits incompatible interpretations
of Section 365(c). However, and of great significance, both Circuits seem to
agree that under the controlling state law in each case (California and
Massachusetts), no actual assignment takes place where a target corporation
survives and continues to operate following a merger or reorganization. See
Perlman, 1999 WL 33702 at *2-4; see also Institute, 104 F.3d at 493-94. This
indicates that in both states, a merged licensee may be able to exercise rights
under a license if it does not file for bankruptcy.
19. An end-user is "Itihe ultimate user of a computer or computer
application in its finished, marketable form." MIcROSOFT PRESS COMPUTER
DICTIONARY 176 (3d ed. 1997).
20. Typically, a mechanical license refers to an agreement that "gives the
right to

reproduce,

distribute,

and

sell copyrighted work. . .

."

See SQL

Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 1991 WL 626458, *5 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
21. Seeid.at*5-6.
22. See Stephen Y. Chow, Intellectual Property Licensing Under UCC 2B, 532
PLI/Pat 723 (1998).
23. See SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458 *5 (citing S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc.,
886 F.2d 1081, 1088 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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lawful owner of a copy of protected software, federal copyright
law allows the end-user to make copies when necessary to
utilize the computer program24 and for archival purposes.25
Moreover, under the first sale doctrine, the end-user is
entitled to transfer title to the copy of software without the
authorization of the copyright owner.26 The transferee retains
the same statutory rights enjoyed by the original end-user
and may use the software subject to the restrictions in the
license.27 Consequently,
issues of assignment and
transferability do not arise in the typical end-user license.
In contrast, a software license may raise assignment and
transferability concerns when it allows use "otherwise
reserved to the copyright holder ... "28 Often, these
agreements resemble traditional mechanical copyright
licenses, where the grant may include the right to reproduce,
distribute, or modify29 the copyrighted software. 0 For
instance, software companies frequently obtain licenses for
source code 3' that is imbedded or simply distributed with
their own software products. Also, companies may obtain a
license to modify another's software, thereby creating a
derivative work, by producing and selling a separate program
that adds features or functionality to the original licensed
software. Licenses of this kind encompass more than
24. The Ninth Circuit held in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), that a reproduction occurs for purposes of
copyright law when a software program is loaded in the Random Access

Memory (RAM) of a computer. This step is essential in the utilization of
computer programs.
25.

See 17 U.S.C. §117.

26. The first sale doctrine provides that once a copyright owner has
transferred title In a copy of the protected work, the ability to restrict or control
re-transfer of that copy to subsequent third parties is lost. See 17 U.S.C. § 109.
27. However, proposed drafts of the UCC 2B produced confusion and

controversy regarding the transfer of title in typical end-user licenses and the
ability of a copyright owner to retain rights that could restrict the re-transfer of
such copies. See David A. Rice, License With Contract And Precedent:PublisherLicensor Protection Consequences And The Rationale Offered For The
Nontransferabilityof Licenses UnderArticle 2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239
(1998).
28. S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989).
29. Modifications are generally unattainable with an end-user license,
where the end-user acquires software in object code only.
30. See SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458 *5.
31. Source code refers to "[hiuman readable program statements.., that
are not directly readable by a computer." MICROSOFT PRESS COMPUTER
DICTIONARY 176 (3d ed. 1997).
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personal use of a single software copy. The licensee's rights
include a "copyright use" subject to federal law regarding
assignment.32
C. The Adoption And Recognition Of The Default Rule.
1. The HarrisDecision
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Harris v. Emus Records

Corp. established a default rule for the assignment of a nonexclusive copyright license by a licensee.33 In 1968, a singer
named Emmylou Harris recorded six songs for an album
entitled Gliding Bird. 4 Harris recorded the songs pursuant to
an agreement with Jay-Gee Record Company 'that entitled
Harris to receive royalties on each record sold.3"
The songs written and composed by Harris were
copyrighted and held in the name of three companies as joint
copyright owners, including a company wholly owned by
Harris. 6 In 1969, the companies issued mechanical licenses
to Jay-Gee and the album was subsequently released. In
1971, Jay-Gee filed for bankruptcy and its trustee sold part
of the company's assets to Suellen Productions Inc.36 In this
purchase, Sullen acquired a master tape that contained the
six songs recorded for the Gliding Bird Album. 9
Suellen transferred any and all rights acquired to
manufacture and distribute the recordings on the Gliding
Bird Album to the defendant, Emus Records.4 ° Emus rereleased the Gliding Bird Album with a new cover and serial
number.41 Harris never received royalty payments from Emus
and consequently filed suit for copyright infringement. 2 As
expressed by the court, "the ultimate question [was] whether
4 3
copyright licenses can be transferred by a mere licensee. 1
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458 *5.
Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 1331.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1332.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1333.
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Relying, in part, on case law discussing the
transferability of patent licenses, the court concluded that a
copyright license cannot be transferred by the licensee
without the express authorization of the licensor." As a
licensee, Jay-Gee could not assign its mechanical licenses to
a third party without the consent of the joint copyright
owners, 45 even in bankruptcy.4 6 "Although [the] defendants
obtained the master tapes, they did not thereby obtain a
license

to

mechanically

reproduce

them."47

Without

a

mechanical license, Emus Records was held liable for
infringing the copyrights of Harris by its release of a new
Gliding Bird album.
2. The SQL Solutions Decision
Although the license agreement in SQL Solutions, Inc. v.
Oracle Corp.4 8 contained an express provision prohibiting

assignment by the licensee, Judge Patel's opinion includes
relevant assignment analysis. SQL Solutions involved the
transfer of a software license by a licensee4 9 in the context of
a reverse triangular merger.50 In 1987, D & N Systems Inc.
("D & N") entered into a software license agreement with
Oracle Corporation. 51 D & N received

a perpetual non-

exclusive license to use Oracle software in its internal
operations. 2 In addition, the license allowed D & N to "modify
Oracle software, to combine it with other software products,
and to copy the software for archival and backup purposes." 3
44. See id. at 1333-34.
45. See i. at 1334-35.
46. In Harris, the Ninth Circuit considered whether copyright licenses pass
to bankruptcy trustees under section 70(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Copyright Act
of 1898, despite a default rule to the contrary. Id. at 1334. Section 70(a)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that "interests" in copyrights vest in
bankruptcy trustees. See i. However, the court found that "for purposes of
§ 70(a)(2) a license is not an interest in a copyright." Id.
47.

Id.

48. 1991 WL 626458 (N.D. Cal.).
49. See id. at * 1-2.
50. A reverse triangular merger is "[a] merger in which the acquiring
corporation's subsidiary is absorbed into the target corporation, which becomes
a new subsidiary of the acquiring corporation." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 413
(pocket ed. 1996).
51. See SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458 at *1.
52. See id.
53. Id.
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D & N utilized the software to create additional software
products that worked in conjunction with, and improved
Oracle's relational database management systems. 4 Also, the
license included a provision that expressly prohibited
assignment or transfer without the written consent of
Oracle.5"
In 1990, D & N merged with a subsidiary of Sybase, Inc. 6
In this reverse triangular merger, the subsidiary of Sybase
dissolved, leaving D & N as the surviving corporation. 7 D & N
changed its name to SQL Solutions, Inc. ("SQL") and became
a wholly owned subsidiary of Sybase through an exchange of
stock ownership. 58 Oracle then claimed that D & N (now SQL)
breached their agreement by transferring the copyright
license to SQL. 9
Initially, SQL maintained that a transfer of rights did not
occur because D & N continued to operate as a subsidiary
and did not dissolve. 60 Applying California law, the court
found that an assignment or transfer of rights did occur
through a change in the legal form of ownership of a
business.6' Notwithstanding the anti-assignment provision of
the license, the court proceeded to determine whether federal
law prohibited the transfer.6 2
Judge Patel noted the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harris
which "enunciated a prohibition against the transfer of
copyright licenses."6 3 Like the Harris court, she stressed the
importance and influential strength of patent law when
determining the assignability of a copyright license.6 4 Judge
Patel verified that federal law prohibits a licensee from
assigning a non-exclusive copyright license without the
consent of the licensor in any merger where state law

54. See id. at *2.
55. See id.
56. See id. The subsidiary of Sybase Inc. was a shell corporation created for
tax purposes only. See iA.
57. See l.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at *3-4.
61. See id. at *4.
62. See il. at *5-6.
63. Id. at *6.
64. See id.
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recognizes a transfer of rights. 5 Having made this
determination, Judge Patel found D & N in breach of the
agreement for violating the anti-assignment provision and
Oracle was entitled to terminate the license.66
II

Analysis
A. Rationale for the Default Rule
1. A Copyright License is Personalto the Licensee

Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harrisv. Emus
Records Corp., the law regarding patent license assignment
has influenced, if not determined, the default rule for nonexclusive copyright licenses.67 As stated by the Ninth Circuit:
"Where precedent in copyright cases is lacking, it is
appropriate to look for guidance to patent law because of the
68
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.'
Thus, to understand the justifications for the default rule on
copyright license assignment, a number of issues and policies
concerning the transferability of non-exclusive patent licenses
must be analyzed. Whether a patent license is a personal
contract evokes such an examination.
In Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Coming, the United States
Supreme Court indicated that a non-exclusive patent license
"is only the grant of a personal power to the licensee, and is
not transferable by him to another."69 Although this assertion
was provided as dicta, ° and despite the absence of reasoning
and explanation for such a declaration, it has been relied
upon and cited as the controlling authority regarding the
transfer of patent licenses.71 Still, no other decision has
65. See d.
66. See Ad.
67. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1983).
68. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417
(1984)).
69. Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Coming, 55 U.S. 193, 216 (1852) (citing
CURTIS ON PATENTS, sec. 198 and 2 Story's Reports, 525, 554).
70. See Farmland Irrigation Co., Inc. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal.2d 208, 221
(1957).

71. A patent license confers a right that is merely personal, "not
transferable, and [is] extinguished with the dissolution of [a) corporation."
Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886), see also Unarco Indus., Inc. v.
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adequately clarified or contributed to the rationale for
preserving this broad default rule. Instead, several decisions
have merely expressed that "[tlhe prohibition against transfer
of patent licenses is longstanding and frequently invoked."7 2
However, in Farmland Irrigation Co., Inc. v. Dopplmaier,
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court admirably
scrutinized the 1852 default rule and concluded that it
lacked utility and logical underpinning. 73 Although federal law
seemingly controls the transferability of non-exclusive patent
licenses,74 Traynor's opinion provides useful insight and
guidance. Ironically, the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that
Justice Traynor's "opinion raises not insignificant questions
about the actual holdings, relevance, and continued vitality of
the nineteenth-century ... 75decisions [that] are cited [as] the
origins of the [default] rule.,
Understandably, a non-exclusive software license lacks
provisions and terms to support a claim that they are by
nature, personal. 76 In contrast to the non-exclusive patent
license in Oliver v. Rumford Chemical Works,7" a nineteenthcentury decision frequently cited as controlling authority,
commonly
require
software
licenses
non-exclusive
performance
performance from a corporate entity. Assuredly,
from a corporate entity is not so distinctive or unique that it
cannot be replicated with equal quality by a merged entity or
the
precise
corporation
(operating under
acquiring
requirements of the original contract). A software license
between corporate parties infrequently requires the personal
skill, ability or qualifications of a specific individual or
individuals.
Moreover, the perpetual nature of many non-exclusive
software licenses illustrates the absence of contractual
characteristics commonly associated with personal service
Kelly, Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972).
72. SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458 at *6.
73. Farmland,48 Cal. 2d at 221.
74. See discussion supraPart II.A.
75. See Everex Sys., Inc:, v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673,
679-80 (9th Cir. 1996).
76. See Farmland,48 Cal.2d at 221 (referring to Oliver v. Rumford Chemical
Works, 109 U.S. 75, 82 (1883)). A non-exclusive software agreement that
incorporates personal services should have "provisions in the license calling for
the exercise of personal skill of the licensee." Id.
77. 109 U.S. 75 (1883).
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agreements. It is not extraordinary to find corporations that
exist and remain competitive for an extended number of
years. A corporation may have a change in directors,
managers, or other personnel throughout its existence.7 8 It

may suffer downturns and swings in productivity that are
tied to the performance of these varying individuals. Despite
such changes, a corporation's obligations are unlikely
transformed. The rights under a perpetual non-exclusive
software license would continue, notwithstanding the
changes in skill, ability and qualifications of its employees.
The personal contract argument is further weakened if
the payment of royalties is the only required performance.
Royalty payments can be made by anyone. Permitting
assignment "would [not] materially impair the nonassigning
party's chance of obtaining the performance he expected." 9
An affirmation that every non-exclusive software license
is personal should not be the default rule. As noted by
Justice Traynor, "[a] flat statement that a license creates a
merely personal right ... [sihould follow as a conclusion from

an examination of the purposes and provisions of the
particular license, rather than stand as a self-evident first
principle." 80 Accordingly, a non-exclusive software license
should be deemed personal when one or both parties to the
contract are individuals.81 Otherwise, the default rule should
presume that all software licenses between two corporate
entities are not personal and therefore transferable. A
licensor should then have the opportunity to rebut this
presumption by showing that the license required the skillful
performance of a specific individual. This pragmatic approach
incorporates the nature of non-exclusive software licenses
and is a logical departure from the default rule announced in
1852.

78. In Farmland,Justice Traynor noted that: "if [the licensor] thought that
control of the corporation by a particular person was essential to assure an
advantageous return of royalties, he would have provided against the possibility
of that person's selling his interest." 48 Cal.2d. at 223.
79. Id. at 222.
80. Id.
81. "[The duties imposed upon one party may be of such a personal nature
that their performance by someone else would in effect deprive the other party
of that for which he bargained." Id.
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2. Permittingthe Assignment of Non-Exclusive Software Licenses
Would Createa Secondary Market and Reduce the Incentive to
Create

In addition to its reliance on patent law in fashioning the

default rule for copyright licenses in Harris,the Ninth Circuit
recognized that prohibiting the assignment of nonexclusive
copyright licenses is in accord with policies underlying the
enactment of the Copyright Act. 2 Specifically, the court
explained that:
The legislative history reveals an acute awareness of the

need to delicately balance. competing interests. On the one
hand, there [is] a strong reluctance to allow a
monopolization of works or compositions; at the same time,
there [is] an awareness of the necessity of preserving the
rights of 83authors and composers in order to stimulate
creativity.

Conformably, several courts have justified the continued
prohibition of non-exclusive license transfer on the ground
that such activity would create a secondary market for
licenses that would diminish the author's ability to profit
from his creation and thereby lessen the incentive to create.84
As summarized by the Ninth Circuit in Everex, with regard to
non-exclusive patent license transfer,
Allowing free assignability.., of nonexclusive patent
licenses would undermine the reward that encourages
invention because a party seeking to use the patented
invention could either seek a license from the patent holder
or seek an assignment of an existing patent license from a
licensee. In essence, every licensee would become a
potential competitor with the licensor-Ipatent
holder in the
8
u
market for licenses under the patents.

To an extent, the Ninth Circuit's concern with
assignability on this basis is notable and correct. Authorizing
unconditional
assignment in non-exclusive
licensing
arrangements could impair a copyright owner's monopoly in
82.

Harris, 734 F.2d at 1334; see also SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458 *5.

83. Harris, 734 F.3d at 1334 (citing H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1909)).
84. See Everex, 89 F.3d at 679; see also In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210
B.R. 237, 242 (1997).
85. Everex, 89 F.3d at 679. This allegation was made in the court's
discussion of federal policy that justifies application of the default rule over
California law. See id.
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three conceivable instances: 1) outright sales by corporations
not engaged in mergers or bankruptcies; 2) sublicensing of
rights under a license; and 3) the assignment of a license to a
direct competitor. However, these considerations may be
resolved by a narrow default rule that permits limited
assignment instead of unobstructed assignment.
First, a default rule allowing transfer only in a merger,
acquisition or bankruptcy would place a pragmatic deterrent
on the unfettered sale of rights by a licensee. A third party
seeking the rights enjoyed by a licensee would be unable to
purchase those rights independently of a merger, acquisition
or bankruptcy proceeding. A feasible secondary market for
license rights would not exist. Transaction costs would
presumably prevent mergers and acquisitions based solely on
the desire to acquire rights under a license. Moreover, it
seems inconceivable that a flourishing corporation would file
for bankruptcy merely to transfer license rights to some third
party.
Second, a new default rule should not be construed or
drafted to allow sublicensing of rights in any agreement
unless expressly permitted in the instrument itself.
Undoubtedly, there is no reason to presume that a default
rule allowing transfer in a merger, acquisition or bankruptcy
proceeding would thereby allow sublicensing. "[A copyright
owner] could.., control the absolute number of licenses in
existence "86 under a default rule that permits assignment.
The right of the copyright owner to control the number of
licensees must not be obstructed. By controlling the absolute
number of licensees, a copyright owner is guaranteed
payment on every license issued, most likely in the form of
royalties or a lump-sum payment by the original licensee. A
default rule allowing the assignment of non-exclusive
software licenses, excluding the right to sublicense, "would
not hamper the [copyright owner's] right to profit from his
monopoly by licensing under it."8 7 Licensees would not profit

from the licensor's monopoly through unauthorized
sublicensing, preventing the existence of this type of
secondary market.
Third, a new default rule could mandate that any
86. Id.
87. Farmland,48 Cal. 2d at 220.

19991

SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT LICENSES

assignment is invalid upon a showing by the licensor that the

transfer will have a detrimental impact on the licensor's
monopoly. For example, a licensor could invalidate a transfer
by proving that the license was transferred to a direct
competitor, including "a party whom the [copyright owner]
itself might be ... unwilling to license. " .This requirement

would prevent the licensor from refusing consent in a transfer
to demand higher licensing fees.89 A licensor should be able to
control the use of its intellectual property, but it should not
be allowed to exact higher fees simply because the original
licensee has merged or.reorganized under bankruptcy law.
3. Assignment Wodld Impede the Licensor's Ability to Monitor Use
and Collect Royalties

A licensor's capacity to collect royalties was an
unmistakable concern of the Ninth Circuit in Harris.90 Indeed,
this particular issue related to the court's analysis of the
competing interests underlying the enactment of the
Copyright Act- balancing the reluctance to grant a monopoly
with the desire to promote creativity. In comparing the notice
requirement in compulsory licenses 9 ' with the need of a
licensor to determine which entities are required to pay
royalties, the court expressed that:
[tihe notice provision for compulsory licenses insures that
the copyright owner can monitor use in order to determine
that accountings are accurate. The same consideration is
relevant [where a licensee transfers his rights under a
license]. By licensing rather than assigning92 his interest in
the copyright, the owner reserves certain rights, including
that of collecting royalties. His ability to monitor use would
be jeopardized by allowin
93 g [transfer or assignment by the
licensee] without notice.

Understandably, a licensor must be able to efficiently and
accurately collect royalties on the use of his intellectual
88. Everex, 89 F.3d at 679.
89. See Institute Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir.
1997).
90. 734 F.2d at 1334.
91. The compulsory licensing provision of the Copyright Act "permitted the
copyright holder to control first use while providing a mechanism for others to
obtain licenses once first use had been authorized." Id.
92. The court's reference to assignment in this instance was that of a
copyright owner that relinquishes his rights in the intellectual property: rather
than licensing- where the copyright owner retains ownership. See id.
93. Id.
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property. However, prohibiting every assignment of nonexclusive copyright licenses is a sweeping response to this
reasonable, but modest, concern.
In Harris, the Ninth Circuit evidently concluded, in part,
that consent is required for transfer because notice of
transfer is central to the licensor's ability to collect royalties.94
Yet, the court should have supplied a full explanation of the
connection between notice and the requirement of consent. A
default rule can be constructed to require notice but not
consent- one is not necessarily dependent upon the other. In
requiring that all licensees provide notice to the licensor upon
transfer or assignment of their rights under a license, the
licensor would have the information necessary to track and
monitor royalty payments.
A second consideration associated with the notice
requirement is the ability of the licensor to monitor the actual
use of intellectual property. Specifically, this refers to the
ability of a licensor to ensure that the licensees are not
engaged in unauthorized use of the copyrighted work- use
outside the scope of the grant embraced by the terms of the
agreement.
This concern was recognized in First Nationwide Bank v.
Florida Software

Service,

Inc.,95

where

the

defendant

intellectual property owner claimed that "anti-assignment [is]
designed to protect [the intellectual property owner] from

unauthorized use of ... computer software."96 However, the

district court observed that "no trade secret violations
occurred as a result of the [acquisition at issue], no
unauthorized use of the software took place and [the
to receive all payments
intellectual property owner] continued
97
due under the original contract."

It would be inappropriate to assume that every recipient
of a non-exclusive software license, by transfer, will engage in
unauthorized use. In fact, whether a license is acquired by
assignment or from the licensor, the recipient is bound to act
in accordance with the terms of the original agreement. To
accommodate the interest of the licensor in ensuring

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
770 F.Supp. 1537, 1540, 43 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 1543.
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authorized use, a default rule need only require notice
whenever a non-exclusive license is transferred. As noted by
the district court in First Nationwide Bank, "no desirable
public policy is served" in preventing a transfer merely to
suppress potential unauthorized use and allow the licensor to
demand higher fees.98 Notice is all that is required.
B. The Default Rule and the Demand for Higher Licensing Fees
The default rule provides licensors with an unreasonable
power to squeeze an additional sum of money from
reorganized and merged corporations.9 9 Although a nonexclusive software licensee can transfer his rights with the
express authorization of the licensor, there is no requirement
or principle that controls the licensor's refusal to provide
consent. In a common reverse triangular merger, which
frequently amounts to a mere change in stock ownership, a
licensor retains the right to refuse authorization until a
second licensing fee is paid by the same corporate entity that
negotiated the original instrument. Fundamentally, such
unreasonable conduct would be "contrary to the spirit of good
faith and cooperation implied in [many licensing agreements
where reasonable consent is expected]."'0 0
In First Nationwide Bank, the president of the defendant
software corporation acknowledged that his corporation
withheld consent merely because "the newly acquired
institutions would not pay the [substantially] increased
license
fees."'
The
defendant
withheld
consent
notwithstanding assurances by the original licensee that no
unauthorized use of the software would occur following the
merger.102 In the words of the district court, the actions of the
defendant amounted to "an attempt at extortion" and
represented "an undeserved windfall as a result of the
unfortunate circumstances which forced [the licensee] into

98.

Id.

99. See Stephen J. Davidson, Selected Legal And Practical Considerations
Concerning 'Scope Of Use' Provisions, 10 NO. 10 COMPUTER LAW 1, *1 (1993).
"[The default rule] may be used by the licensor in an effort to extract excessive
license or renewal fees after the licensee has become reliant on the software in
its business." Id.
100. FirstNationwide Bank, 770 F. Supp. at 1543.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1540.
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insolvency."'' 3 When a licensor fails to address assignment in
the terms of a license, he should not be able to demand that
the same legal entity, as recognized under corporate law, pay
an additional penalty for becoming insolvent and selling its
stock to a third party. Essentially, to allow such a demand
would grant a licensor the power to punish a licensee for
using an unsuccessful business plan.
Additionally, the foreseeable risk of higher licensing fees
and license termination intervenes in bankruptcy decision
making. "Non-exclusive patent licenses [for example,]
frequently are

the economic

centerpiece. ..

of a high-

technology business. When that is the case for an
economically distressed licensee, any consideration of a
Chapter 11 case for such a company must be tempered by
caution if the license does not expressly permit assignment
by the licensee.""0 4
C. The Default Rule Can Produce Unequal Results

1. The SQL Solutions Decision vs. The PerlmanDecision
As previously mentioned, the district court in SQL
Solutions found that a transfer of rights is legally recognized
in a reverse triangular merger under California law. °5
Accordingly, the district court applied the federal rule
regarding non-exclusive copyright license transferability and
concluded that the merged corporation could not exercise its
rights under the license.0 6 This is in contrast to the Ninth
07
Circuit's decision in Perlmanv. CatapultEntertainment,Inc.1
In Perlman, the Ninth Circuit implicitly recognized that a
transfer of rights does not occur in a merger where the target
corporation survives and continues to operate as a distinct
legal entity. 01 8 The Ninth Circuit was compelled to decide
whether section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code prevented a
103. Id. at 1543.
104. Adam A. Lewis, 9th Circuit Holds Non-Exclusive Patent Licensee Cannot
Assign License Without Licensor's Consent, 15-OCT AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30,
*30 (1996).
105. SQL Solutions, 1991 WL 626458, *3-4.
106. See id.at *5-6.
107. Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment,Inc., (In re Catapult Entertainment,
Inc.), 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999).
108. Id. at 754.
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merged corporation from assuming a patent license in the
midst of a bankruptcy proceeding."°9 The court applied a
"hypothetical test" to determine if the license could be
assumed by the licensee. ' Under the "hypothetical test," the
Ninth Circuit held that a licensee cannot assume a license if
"applicable law" would prevent transfer of that license to a
hypothetical third party."' Having decided that the federal
rule prohibiting assignment and transfer constitutes
"applicable law" for purposes of section 365(c), the Ninth
Circuit determined that the Bankruptcy Code prevented the
licensee from assuming its own license.1 2
Still, the fact that the Ninth Circuit applied, the
"hypothetical test" indicates that it did not consider the
licensee a third party after the merger. 3 If a transfer of rights
had occurred as a result of the merger, application of the
"hypothetical test" would be unnecessary, since the licensor
could refuse performance from the licensee. In fact, the Ninth
Circuit expressed that "subsection (c)(1) [of the Bankruptcy
Code would] have to be applied a second time if the debtor in
possession [(licensee)] wishes to assign the contract in
question."" 4 This assertion further demonstrates that the
licensee's assumption and exercise of rights under the license
did not amount to a transfer or assignment.
In sum, the District Court in SQL Solutions found that a
transfer of rights does occur in a merger where the licensee
survives, while the Ninth Circuit did not. In a jurisdiction
that interprets state law as the court did in SQL Solutions, the
default rule will prevent assignment in reverse triangular
mergers. Yet, the default rule will have no impact in a
jurisdiction or court that does not recognize a transfer of
rights in reverse triangular mergers. This distinction will
create varying and unequal outcomes upon application of the
default rule. This inconsistency could be avoided if the
default rule allowed assignment when the licensee survived.

109. See id. at 748.
110. See id. at 749.
IIi. See id.
112. See id. at 754-55.
113. See id. at 749.
114. Id. at 752.
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2. The Institute PasteurDecision vs. The PerlmanDecision
Similar

inconsistencies

are

evinced

when

the

First

Circuit's decision in Institute Pasteur is compared with the
Ninth's Circuit's decision in Perlman. Although the
distinctions between these cases relate to the interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Code, the results indicate how application
of the default rule can produce irregular outcomes. Again, in
Perlman, the Ninth Circuit applied a "hypothetical test" in
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code." 5 This "hypothetical test"
would prevent a licensee from assuming a license when
applicable law would prevent assignment to some
"hypothetical" third party. 116 The default rule constitutes

applicable law and consequently prevents a licensee from
assuming a license in bankruptcy."'
In contrast, the First Circuit adopted an "actual
performance test.""18 Under the "actual. performance test," a
licensee in bankruptcy cannot assume a license if the
licensor would have to accept performance from an "actual"
third party. 19 In Institute Pasteur, the licensee was a target
corporation that did not dissolve following the merger.'2 ° The
licensee had no intention of assigning the license to a third
party once assumed. 2 ' Instead, the licensee sought to
exercise the rights granted under the original license. 22 The
court held that the merged corporation could assume the
license because the licensee did not constitute a third party
23
and there was no indication of subsequent assignment.
Hence, under the "actual performance test," the default rule
does not prevent a licensee from assuming a software license
when that licensee has no intention of assigning it to a third
party, hypothetical or not.
In short, the default rule prevents a debtor in possession
(licensee) from assuming its own license in jurisdictions that
apply the "hypothetical test." However, a licensee may
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 749.
id.
id. at 750.
Institute Pasteur,104 F.3d at 493.
id.
id. at 490-91.
id. at 494.

122.

See id.

123.

See id.at 493-94.
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assume a license if the "actual performance test" described in
Institute Pasteur is applied. In the "actual performance test,"
the default rule does not prevent assumption, only
assignment. This additional peculiarity demonstrates how the
default rule can create incongruous law among the federal
circuits. Furthermore, even if the United States Supreme
Court addressed this bankruptcy issue, choosing one test
over the other, it would not overcome the mismatched results
that occur due to different interpretations of state law
regarding the transfer of rights in merger activity, as in SQL
Solutions and Perlman.
III
Proposal
Several considerations control in shaping a new default
rule for the assignment of non-exclusive software licenses.
These considerations include: 1) whether the license requires
performance by an individual (resembling a personal service
contract); 2) whether the licensee should be able to assign or
transfer the license at any time (or under particular
circumstances); 3) whether the licensee can sublicense; 4)
whether the licensee can assign or transfer the license to a
direct competitor of the licensor; and 5) whether the licensor
must receive notice of assignment or transfer.
The ideal solution to this issue would be the adoption of a
new default rule by Congress and subsequent incorporation
of that rule into the Copyright Act. This approach would
eradicate inconsistencies among the federal circuits and
provide a uniform rule that could be amended or altered at
one time- rather than incrementally among the circuits. This
default rule could correspond to the following:
A non-exclusive copyright license in computer software may
be:
a) assigned by a licensee in a merger or acquisition if:
1) neither party to the license is an individual;
2) the license does not expressly require substantial
performance from a specific individual;
3) the license is assigned to a merged or acquired entity
that survives; and
4) the licensee provides reasonable notice to the
licensor before such assignment occurs, or
b) assumed or assigned by a licensee in a bankruptcy
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proceeding if:
1) neither party to the license is an individual;
2) the license does not expressly require substantial
performance from a specific individual; and
3) the licensee provides reasonable notice to the
licensor before such assumption or assignment occurs.
A licensor can invalidate an assumption or assignment
under this provision by proving that substantial injury will
result (including, but not limited to, assignment to a direct
competitor of the licensor). This provision shall not be
construed to allow sublicensing by any licensee without the
express authorization of the licensor.
This proposed rule would allow assignment in mergers
and acquisitions. However, it would prevent a licensee from
assigning the license to a party other than itself (in a merged
or acquired form) due to the survival requirement. The rule
'would avoid the development of a secondary market
stemming from merger and acquisition activity. In addition,
this default rule would constitute "applicable law" under the
Bankruptcy Code. It would allow assignment to a third party
in bankruptcy only and assumption by a debtor in possession
so that a reorganized company could resume operations
following bankruptcy.
IV
Conclusion
As software licenses continue to become an integral part
of business, the need to secure rights granted thereunder will
only increase. In many instances, a software license can
represent a substantial portion of a corporation's value to
investors and the public. When these licenses are terminated
upon application of the current default rule, licensors have a
unique opportunity to exact increased licensing fees. The
default rule persists despite this activity and despite the
questionable policies and rationale upon which it is based. A
new default rule should be adopted that provides an
exception in mergers, acquisitions and bankruptcies.
Permitting assignment in these limited capacities reflects a
balance between the goals of promoting creativity and limiting
the right to a monopoly. It is a pragmatic compromise.

